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Abstract
In this paper we consider a real-time, dynamic pickup and delivery problem with time-
windows where orders should be assigned to one of a set of competing transportation com-
panies. Our approach decomposes the problem into a multi-agent structure where vehicle
agents are responsible for the routing and scheduling decisions and the assignment of orders
to vehicles is done by using a second-price auction. Therefore the system performance will
be heavily dependent on the pricing strategy of the vehicle agents. We propose a pricing
strategy for vehicle agents based on dynamic programming where not only the direct cost of
a job insertion is taken into account, but also its impact on future opportunities. We also
propose a waiting strategy based on the same opportunity valuation. Simulation is used to
evaluate the benefit of pricing opportunities compared to simple pricing strategies in different
market settings. Numerical results show that the proposed approach provides high quality
solutions, in terms of profits, capacity utilization and delivery reliability.
Keywords: Transportation; Multi-agent systems; Auctions/bidding; Scheduling;
1 Introduction
Most techniques and models used in transportation planning, scheduling and routing use central-
ized solution approaches with static input data. Although such techniques have successfully been
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implemented, they are less suitable in a dynamic environment and in an environment with multi-
ple independent stakeholders. An example of such an environment are online freight and vehicle
exchange services such as Teleroute (www.teleroute.com).
Dynamic environments are characterized by frequent and unpredictable modifications in the
relevant planning information and the ability (or even necessity) to update the planning based on
this additional information. For example, carriers may know only a fraction of the shipments to
be served when the first plan is constructed whereas additional (rush) transportation jobs arrive
during execution of the original plan. Also, job characteristics as the volume may change during
execution. Further, additional information on processing times (travel time updates in case of
congestion) and equipment failures may arrive during execution. A proper transport planning
approach should be able to construct initial plans taking into account all such uncertainties and
to update the plans reacting on real-time information updates.
Particularly for real-time planning updates a central approach is not suitable, because a global
re-optimization may lead to a completely different plan in response to a relatively minor infor-
mation update. A decentralized approach where local problems are solved locally as much as
possible to limit schedule disruption has certainly advantages. Besides, it is known that the added
value of global optimization versus local planning heuristics decreases in an uncertain, dynamic
environment, see e.g. (Heijden et al. 2002). Finally, a distributed solution is required when mul-
tiple independent organizational units (multiple fleet managers and shippers) are working in an
autonomous, self-interested and not necessarily cooperative way. Then a distributed approach is
needed to optimize the network performance (maximize profits) while reckoning with the individual
competences, goals and information access.
In the literature, our transportation problem is known as a dynamic multi-vehicle pickup and
delivery problem with time windows. We consider a variant with full truckloads and stochastic
arrivals of jobs. Within the transportation network multiple shippers offer loads for transportation
and multiple fleet managers are competing for these jobs. We propose an agent-based solution
approach where vehicle agents are responsible for their own routing and scheduling. The assign-
ment of jobs to vehicles will be done by using an auction. Therefore a proper pricing mechanism
is needed to optimize the system wide performance, such as the minimization of the total costs,
consisting of transportation costs and penalties on lateness.
In an earlier paper (Mes et al. 2006) we presented a basic multi-agent system and com-
pared its performance with two traditional scheduling heuristics. This paper aims to enhance the
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performance of this agent-based transportation system by improving the pricing and scheduling
techniques of the vehicle agents. We will focus on two key questions. First, how can we use infor-
mation on historic job patterns to improve planning and scheduling? Second, what is the impact
of such additional intelligence on the overall system performance?
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we give an overview of
related literature and we explain the contribution of our paper. Our model is presented in Section
3. In Section 4 we present our solution method to estimate the value of a schedule using value
functions. In Section 5 we explain how these value functions can be used to determine a waiting
strategy. In Section 6 we discuss some extensions of our method. Experimental settings and simu-
lation results are presented in Section 7. We end up with conclusions, remarks on generalizations
and directions for further research (Section 8).
2 Literature
Our problem is well known in the area of vehicle routing problems (VRP). The VRP and its
variants have been studied extensively; see (Laporte et al. 1992; Toth and Vigo 2002) for a
survey. Most work focuses on static and deterministic problems in which all information is known
in advance, see for example (Desrosiers et al. 1995; Fischer 1995). In dynamic and stochastic
vehicle routing problems (also known as real-time routing and dispatching problems) the input
data (travel times, demands) are stochastic and change over time. Therefore, the output of a
dynamic VRP (DVRP) is not a set of routes, but rather a policy that prescribes how the routes
should evolve as a function of those inputs that evolve in real-time (Psaraftis 1988).
Routing and scheduling in a dynamic environment has been studied by a number of authors,
see for example (Psaraftis 1988; Gendreau and Potvin 1998). The most common approach to
handle these problems is to solve a model using the data that are known at a certain point in
time, and to re-optimize as soon as new data become available. Because a fast response is required
in a real-time environment, a solution is usually achieved by using relatively simple heuristics or
by parallel computation methods, see (Giani et al. 2003) for an overview of approaches.
Another line of research is on dynamic fleet management problems (DFMP), or more general the
dynamic assignment problem. These problems ask for a dynamic assignment of resources (trucks)
to tasks (loads). Truly stochastic models decompose the DFMP with respect to time periods and
assess the impact of the current decisions on the future through a recourse or value function.
Examples can be found in (Carvalho and Powell 2000; Godfrey and Powell 2002; Topaloglu and
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Powell 2002).
A more recent development is the applicability of multi-agent systems (MAS) in the field
of transportation control. This research aims at the development of robust, distributed market
mechanisms. In an early paper Sandholm (1993) applied a bidding protocol, called Contract Net
Protocol, to a transportation system, where dispatch centers of different companies cooperate
automatically in vehicle routing. Fischer et al. (1996) developed a system for cooperative trans-
portation scheduling and a simulation test bed for multi-agent transport planning, called MARS.
Another interesting contribution comes from Figliozzi et al. (2003), who present a framework
for the study of carriers’ strategies in an auction marketplace for dynamic, full truckload vehicle
routing with time windows. As in this paper, they use a Vickrey auction and a simple heuristic
for generating bids, namely the additional costs of serving a shipment by appending it to the end
of the vehicle schedule. They focus on profit allocation rather than on the efficiency of assignment
decisions. In (Figliozzi et al. 2004) they study the impact of different assignment strategies on the
travel costs under various demand conditions. They consider four fleet assignment methods that
are related to the agent-based approaches considered in this paper. In (Hoen and Poutré 2004)
a multi-agent system is presented for real-time vehicle routing problems with consolidation in a
multi-company setting, where vehicles have the option to break an agreement in favor of a better
deal.
The main contribution of our paper is that we combine the basic ideas behind DFMP to
enhance the bidding strategy of vehicle agents in a multi-agent setting for transport planning.
We cannot use the DFMP algorithms directly, because in our case vehicles may schedule multiple
transportation jobs in advance. Also the price of a job is not given externally but subject to
negotiation. Moreover, the arrival intensity of jobs at a company is not described by an exogenous
information process, but can be influenced by better repositioning of vehicles. Further, DFMP is
only developed for central optimization and not for a multi-actor setting.
Compared to the research on MAS in the field of transportation management, we focus on the
intelligence of agents instead of the MAS architecture as is often subject of research. In our case,
this intelligence is mainly concerned with the bid price calculation and the valuation of future
implications of new job insertions. This certainly distinguishes our approach from other research
in agent-based transportation planning, such as (Figliozzi et al. 2003) and (Hoen and Poutré
2004).
We focus on the bidding strategy of vehicle agents in a multi-agent setting where the intelligence
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of agents arises from historical information on job patterns and prices. That is, the bidding strategy
should account for the attractiveness of remaining capacity in a vehicle route. This consists of two
issues: First, the attractiveness of a schedule destination, based on the probability that during
schedule execution a profitable job may arise to be picked up nearby. Second, the attractiveness of
so-called “gaps” in a schedule that may arise because two jobs with very distinct time windows are
assigned to a vehicle so that time between execution of these two jobs is available for an additional
job.
To model this, we will use the basic ideas behind DFMP as discussed in (Powell et al. 1988).
Because this is already a hard problem as we will see, we limit the dynamism in our model to
real-time arrival of jobs during schedule execution, whereas we exclude other sources of uncertainty
like congestion influenced travel times and equipment failures.
3 Model and notation
We consider a pickup and delivery problem with full truckloads, deterministic travel times, and
stochastic arrival of jobs. To present our model we subsequently discuss the network and cost
structure (3.1), job characteristics (3.2), the market mechanism (3.3) and the vehicle scheduling
and bid calculation (3.4) in the next subsections.
3.1 Network description
Our transportation network consists of a set of nodes N and a set of arcs A connecting these
nodes. In this network multiple fleet managers and shippers operate. The system dynamics is
driven by the incoming jobs from shippers that are not known beforehand. These jobs consist of
unit loads (full truckloads) which have to be transported between nodes in the network. A set of
vehicles V, belonging to the different fleet managers is available to transport these loads.
We define the handling time of an order as the sum of the loaded travel time and time for
loading and unloading. The handling time for a job from node i to node j is deterministic and
given by τfij . The empty travel time from node i to j is given by τ
e
ij and we assume that τ
e
ij < τ
f
ij
for all routes. We further use the notation τeijk to indicate the trip τ
e
ij + τ
e
jk.
Objective of the shippers is to minimize their costs. Objective of the fleet managers is to
maximize their profits. We consider two costs functions, namely the travel costs ct (t) as function
of the travel time t and the penalty costs cp (t) in case of lateness (t > 0) which is an arbitrary
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Figure 1: Demand driven online order assignment
positive non-decreasing function of the time t. Of course the travel cost function can easily be
extended to reckon with different types of moves (full, empty or pro-active).
In order to cover the transportation costs, the fleet managers will charge the shippers for their
transportation services. The total costs for a shipper are given by the sum of all prices paid to the
fleet managers for transporting their loads. The profits for the fleet managers are given by their
income from all transportation jobs minus the transportation costs and cost for lateness.
Matching of jobs with open vehicle capacity is done using an auction procedure which leads to
a contract between a fleet manager and a shipper. Execution of the resulting contracts requires
scheduling of the vehicles while taking the contract terms into account. Vehicle scheduling has its
impact on the future availability of vehicle capacity and on the system dynamics and hence impact
on the profitability of the companies. A general impression of the situation is given in Figure 1.
As for the dynamics and control, we assume that the system is stable in the long run, so
that all jobs can be handled. As for communication, we assume that at any moment in time
communication between shippers, vehicles and fleet managers is possible.
3.2 Job characteristics
Jobs to transport unit loads (full truckloads) between nodes in the network arrive one-by-one
according to a stationary Poisson process with arrival intensity λkl of jobs from k to l. We define
a job ϕ by the following characteristics:
• the announcement time a (ϕ);
• its origin: node o (ϕ);
• its destination: node d (ϕ);
• the earliest pickup time of the load at its origin: s (ϕ);
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• the latest pickup time of the load at its origin: e (ϕ);
The contract terms describe whether the constraints s (ϕ) and e (ϕ) may be violated and the
penalty on violations. We assume that these terms are equal for all jobs. We further assume that
the fleet manager agrees with the earliest pickup time as a hard restriction and the latest delivery
time as soft restriction with penalty costs cp (t).
We consider two types of contracts, namely contracts with fixed and flexible pickup times. In
case of fixed pickup times, the exact pickup and delivery time are agreed upon in the contract and
fleet managers are not allowed to change these times later on. In case of flexible pickup times,
the pickup and delivery time may be modified during schedule execution where the pickup time is
bounded by s (ϕ) time and penalty costs are charged if the latest delivery time e (ϕ) is exceeded.
To keep the presentation simple, we first consider fixed contracts and discuss in Section 8 how the
results can be extended to flexible contracts.
The time between the earliest pickup time s (ϕ) and the announcement time a (ϕ) is called the
look-ahead of job ϕ. To simplify our presentation we assume that the look-ahead of all jobs is zero
(which will be generalized in Section 8). The time between the earliest pickup time and latest
pickup time is referred to as the time-window length of job ϕ. We assume that the time-window
length of future jobs (e (ϕ)− s (ϕ)) can be estimated based on the route. Therefore we introduce
the notation zkl for the expected time-window length for jobs on route kl. Finally, we assume
that an external job in process cannot be interrupted (no preemption). That is, a vehicle may not
temporarily drop a load in order to handle a more profitable load and return later.
3.3 Market mechanism
The shippers and fleet managers meet at a market place where jobs are assigned using some auction
mechanism. When all bids are known to each bidder we speak of an open auction, otherwise a
closed (sealed-bid) auction. An example of an open auction is the well known English auction in
which bidders sequentially raise their bids until nobody is willing to bid higher; the object is then
sold at that final price. An example of a closed auction is the Vickrey auction in which every
bidder submits a single sealed bid and the bidder with the highest bid will receive the object at
the price of the second highest bid.
We will use a open second-price auction which is frequently used in online auctions (Caserta
2002) as a mixture between the English auction and the Vickrey auction. Bidders submit their
maximum valuation like in the Vickrey auction, and leave sequential bidding rounds (also called
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proxy bidding) to a software program. In this open second-price auction bidders only have to
place their true valuation of the object once and bids are publicly accessible. Note that for our
purposes it is sufficient if bidders have information about the best bid, which equals the final price
paid by the shipper. Generalization towards closed auctions is presented in Section 8.
We use this open second-price auction because of its simplicity. Under general conditions, the
optimal bidding strategy under such an auction is to bid your true valuation, see (Vickrey 1961).
Note that this is not as simple as it seems as we aim to take into account opportunity costs in this
paper. Let us illustrate this using an example. Suppose that a vehicle has accepted a job from
A to B and has to bid on a job from C to D. The net additional costs are costs of driving empty
from B to C and driving loaded from C to D plus possibly lateness costs plus possibly waiting
costs if the time windows do not match. However, when taking into account opportunity costs, it
is possible that the new schedule destination D is less attractive than the old schedule destination
B, because the possibility of getting an attractive job is simply lower. We aim to include this in
our cost calculations by adding an estimate for the expected profit loss when staying in location
D instead of B and taking into account the timing at which the vehicle is available. As it will
appear, this is not a trivial matter.
We implement the market mechanism as follows. When an job ϕ arrives at some shipper he
starts an auction by sending an announcement to all fleet managers. All fleet managers respond
with a bid confirming agreement with the contract terms. The shipper evaluates all bids and the
winning fleet manager will receive a grant message while the others receive reject messages.
In this paper we will focus on the transportation side: the fleet managers and their vehicles. A
fleet manager has to face two decision problems, namely the bidding decision and the assignment
decision. The bidding decision is concerned with the calculation of the minimum price for which
the fleet manager is willing to handle the job. This bidding policy uses information about the
state of the fleet manager and his vehicles, the characteristics of the load, the marginal cost of
serving this load, and beliefs about the competitors and environment. Such a policy is important
because it is critical to the revenue of a company. The calculation of a bid should be made in
a short time. The assignment decision refers to the assignment of the job to a vehicle and the
modification of the vehicle schedule to handle this job. This decision is not necessarily irreversible
but can be modified (reassignment) when information is updated.
The bidding decision problem requires the fleet managers to calculate the expected cost for
doing this job. However, complete assessment of the feasibility and the expected profit of a job in
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real-time is hard. In order to respond fast to these auctions we choose for a distributed structure
where every vehicle calculates a bid for this job and sends it to its fleet manager. Therefore
vehicles are modeled as intelligent agents that determine their bidding and scheduling strategy
based on historic data (experience), learning and on expectations of future consequences of current
actions. They have the opportunity of learning about the environment and about other players
with each auction. Each vehicle agent is responsible for the planning and scheduling decisions for
its corresponding vehicle.
When a fleet manager receives an announcement he will send a request to all his vehicles to
calculate the expected cost for handling this job. After receiving all bids from his vehicles he
selects the bid with the lowest costs and sends it to the auction. When this fleet manager receives
a grant for this job, it will be assigned to the vehicle whose bid was submitted to the auction. We
assume that there is no exchange of jobs between vehicles.
3.4 Vehicle scheduling and bid calculation
Vehicle agents face three types of decisions: bidding decisions, scheduling decisions and waiting
decisions. In this section we explain how these decisions can be made. Because we focus on
the strategies of individual vehicle agents, we omit any subscripts indicating specific vehicles or
companies.
3.4.1 Schedule definition
At each point in time, a vehicle has a job schedule, i.e., a list of jobs with scheduled starting
times. The destination of the last job in the schedule will be referred to as schedule destination
and the time until the expected arrival time at the schedule destination is referred to as length of
a schedule.
Formally, we define a schedule Ψ by an ordered list of 2-tuples Ψn =
¡
ψn,1, ψn,2
¢
where ψn,1
refers to a specific job ϕ and ψn,2 to the scheduled pickup time of this job. We can see a schedule
as a sequence of loaded moves and gaps. The loaded move for job n goes from o(ψn,1) to d(ψn,1),
starting at time ψn,2 and being delivered at time ψn,2 + τ
f
o(ψn,1)d(ψn,1)
. A gap appears between
two consecutive loaded moves whenever the pickup time of the second job is later then the delivery
time of the first job. Such a gap may be needed for an empty move from the destination of the first
job to the origin of the second job. Further, we introduce the phrase end-gap for the difference
between the planning period T (which we choose to be much larger then the length of a schedule)
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Figure 2: Example of a vehicle schedule
and the length of a schedule. The gaps and the end-gap are important to value a schedule, because
future jobs can only be inserted in these periods. An illustration of a possible schedule can be
found in Figure 2.
3.4.2 Scheduling and waiting decisions
When an auction for a job is started, each vehicle agent creates a temporal schedule combining its
current schedule with the new job. In this paper, we assume that vehicle agents can insert a new
job at any position in the current schedule without altering the order of execution for the other
jobs. Since the fixed contract agreements do not permit moving already assigned jobs, a new job
can only be inserted in gaps for which the agreed pickup times for other jobs are not violated.
If the gap is larger than the time needed to insert the job, the vehicle agent has flexibility
to select the best pick-up time. One option is to schedule the new job as early as possible, but
in some situations it may be advantageous to postpone. Let us illustrate that using an example
referring to Figure 2. Suppose that a job from A to C should be inserted in the schedule and that
this job can be started at any time between t = 3 and t = 5, because the job handling time equals
τfAC = 2 and it takes τ
e
BA = 1 to drive empty from B to A. If we schedule the job as early as
possible (start at t = 3), the vehicle will arrive in C at t = 5. Probably, the vehicle has to wait
there until the next job can be picked up at t = 7. After all, the probability that another job can
be inserted in this time interval is low, because an empty ride is needed anyway. If on the other
hand the start of the job is scheduled at t = 5, the vehicle will arrive in C at t = 7 so that the
next job can be started immediately. Then the vehicle has three time units to drive from B to A.
Then it is very well possible that another job can be inserted in this interval, either from B to A
or between other locations that require only little additional empty driving time.
The choice of the starting time for a job in a gap in the current schedule is equivalent to finding
the optimal length of the newly created gap before the new job. We will refer to this choice as
the waiting strategy. Upon arrival at a gap, the vehicle agent also faces an operational waiting
decision. Suppose the vehicle is currently located in node i and has to be at node j at time t, then
he has three options. First, he can drive immediately to node j and wait over there. Second, he
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can wait at node i until he wins another job or at last drives to node j at time t− τ eij . Third, he
can drive pro-actively to another node k in anticipation of a future job and if he does not receive
such a job, he can move at time t − τekj to node j. The waiting strategy and the operational
waiting decisions are presented in Section 6.
The scheduling decision is concerned with choosing the best position and pickup time for the
new job in the current schedule given a certain waiting strategy. A vehicle agent updates its
schedule when (i) the first loaded move in a schedule has been completed, and (ii) an auction for
a new job is won. In the first case, the vehicle agent applies its waiting strategy, i.e., the vehicle
either starts immediately with the next loaded move or it waits at its current location or it moves
empty to a better location. In the second case, the vehicle agent replaces its current schedule with
the temporal schedule that had been constructed for the auction.
3.4.3 Bid calculation
A vehicle agent bids the marginal cost of a job insertion, taking into account the expected revenues
due to future job insertions in both the current and the temporal schedule. To construct a temporal
schedule, a vehicle agent evaluates all possible insertions of the new job in the schedule. Because
the first job of the schedule is always in execution, the number of options equals the number of
jobs in the current schedule |Ψ|. For a given position m in the schedule (i.e., after the mth job
in the current schedule), the vehicle agent has to select the most profitable pickup time ω for the
new job. Therefore, the bid price b(ϕ,Ψ) for a new job ϕ given the current schedule Ψ is given by:
b (ϕ,Ψ) = min
m,ω
¡
Cd (ϕ, ω) +OC (ϕ,m, ω,Ψ)
¢
(1)
where m = 1..|Ψ| and ω ≥ s (ϕ). Given the fixed contract agreements (see Section 3.2) this pickup
time ω is also bounded by the starting time of the next job in the schedule. OC (ϕ,m, ω,Ψ)
denotes the opportunity costs of scheduling a new job ϕ at position m and pickup time ω in the
current schedule Ψ (see the next section for the calculation of this function). The direct costs
Cd (ϕ, ω) of picking up the new job ϕ at time ω is given by the travel costs for the loaded move
and possibly penalty costs:
Cd (ϕ, ω) = ct
³
τfo(ϕ)d(ϕ)
´
+ cp
³
(ω − e (ϕ))+
´
(2)
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The costs for a possible empty move towards the origin of the new job ϕ are not included in the
direct costs because these costs are not certain but can possibly be replaced by a loaded move.
Empty moves are always part of a gap and are therefore described by the opportunity costs.
The vehicle agent selects schedule option m with pickup time ω corresponding to the lowest
bid price b(ϕ,Ψ) and submits this bid with the expected pickup time ω to the auction.
4 Opportunity costs and value functions
The opportunity costs describe the loss in expected future revenues due to a job insertion, taking
into account the stochastic job arrival process. That is, the vehicle agent does not know which jobs
will arrive, when they arrive, and which auctions will be won. However the agent has information
about past jobs and auctioning processes that can be used to estimate the attractiveness of a
specific time slot at a specific location for the vehicle. We quantify the attractiveness using value
functions. First, the value of the end-gap (shorthand end value) V e (i, σ, t), which is the expected
revenue during a period t after arrival at schedule destination i at time σ from now on. Second,
the gap value V g (i, j, σ, t) which is the expected value of all future moves in a gap defined by node
i at the beginning of the gap, node j at the end of the gap, σ the time until the delivery at node
i and t the length of the gap.
The parameter t in the end value function is the length of the end-gap. In Section 3.4.1 we
introduced a planning horizon T . Initially we consider the remaining time t = T −σ until the end
of the planning horizon. Later we will iterate on this time t so that the remaining horizon will be
shorter after each transition. In the remainder we use to word time-to-go to indicate the time σ
from now till the arrival at the schedule destination i or the starting node i of the gap.
4.1 Opportunity costs calculation
Suppose that at current time θ an auction is started for a new job ϕ. The vehicle agent calculates
the opportunity costs for this job as follows:
• Suppose that the new job is added to the end of the current schedule (at position m = |Ψ|)
that is characterized by schedule destination i, time-to-go σ and a remaining planning horizon
T − σ. Recall that we have chosen T much larger then the length of a schedule. Then, the
earliest time at which the new job can be scheduled is given by the end time of the current
schedule θ+ σ plus possibly empty travel time to the origin of the new job τ e (i, o(ϕ)). The
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opportunity costs OC (ϕ,m, ω,Ψ) of scheduling job ϕ at time ω (ω ≥ θ + σ + τe (i, o(ϕ)) are
given by the old end value minus the new end value and possibly minus the value of a gap
before this new job:
OC (ϕ,m,ω,Ψ) = V e (i, σ, T − σ)− V g (i, o (ϕ) , σ, ω − σ − θ)− (3)
V e
³
d (ϕ) , ω + τfo(ϕ)d(ϕ) − θ, T − ω − τ
f
o(ϕ)d(ϕ)
´
• Suppose the new job is inserted in a gap {i, j, σ, t} scheduled to be picked up at time ω. Again,
the earliest time at which the new job can be scheduled is given by the start time of the gap
θ+σ plus possible empty travel time to the origin of the new job τ e (i, o(ϕ)). The latest time
at which the new job can be scheduled is given by the end time of the gap θ+σ+ t, possibly
minus empty travel time from the destination of the new job to the origin of the next job in
the schedule τe (d(ϕ), j). So, we have that θ+σ+ τe (i, o (ϕ)) ≤ ω ≤ θ+σ+ t− τe (d(ϕ), j).
If the lower bound exceeds the upper bound, the job cannot be scheduled in the gap. The
opportunity costs are given by the value of the old gap minus the value of two new gaps that
are possibly created by this insertion (before and after the planned execution of ϕ):
OC (ϕ,m, ω,Ψ) = V g (i, j, σ, t)− V g (i, o (ϕ) , σ, ω − σ − θ)− (4)
V g
³
d (ϕ) , j, ω + τfo(ϕ)d(ϕ) − θ, θ + σ + t− ω − τ
f
o(ϕ)d(ϕ)
´
4.2 Value functions
In our multi-agent setting, the vehicle agent should find a sequence of decisions such that his
expected trajectory of future states within gaps or at the end-gap yields the maximum expected
reward. The values of these trajectories are given by the value functions V e and V g for which we
can derive recursive relations. After discretization of the time, we obtain a Stochastic Dynamic
Programming (SDP) recursion.
The recursive relations are described by four types of information; state space, decision set,
transition probabilities and expected rewards. We use the state variables to capture all necessary
information to value the future behavior of the system to be controlled. Derived directly from the
value functions at the beginning of Section 4 we use {i, j, σ, t} to describe the state within a gap
and {i, σ, t} for the state in an end-gap. We present the recursion for end values only because the
gap values are derived in a similar manner. The necessary modifications for the gap values will be
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Figure 3: Transition of end states
discussed at the end of this section.
An illustration of the transition of states in the end-gap can be found in Figure 3. In this
example, the current time is θ = 9, the planning horizon is T = 14 and the vehicle schedule
initially ends in location C at time 17, so the state at time θ = 9 is given by {i, σ, t} = {C, 8, 6}.
Suppose that the vehicle agent wins a next job at time 13 with origin C and destination B, to be
picked up at time 17 and to be delivered at time 19. Then his state at the auctioning time 13 is
given by {B, 6, 4}.
As mentioned in section 3.4.2, a vehicle has two decision moments: (i) at an announcement
of a new order and (ii) after delivery of an order. At an announcement vehicles do not have to
decide about their bids prices that are simply given by Equation 1. However they have to decide
about the pickup and delivery time of this order. In our recursion, we assume that new jobs are
scheduled as early as possible, and therefore are always added to the end of the schedule. We
further assume in our recursion that if a vehicle finished an order and his schedule is not empty,
he will drive directly towards the origin of the next order.
Whenever he finished a job and his schedule is empty he has to decide where to wait. Therefore
we consider the decision δ (i) ∈ N to move pro-actively to node δ (i) directly upon arrival at node
i. If δ (i) = i, the decision is to wait at the current node i. In the remainder we will use the
shorthand notation δ instead of δ (i). Of course a vehicle will only make this decisions when it is
waiting at some node (σ = 0). So if his current state is given by {i, 0, t} then his next state after
making decision δ is given by {δ, τeiδ, t− τeiδ}.
To derive a recursion for the end values V e (i, σ, t), we consider the following three cases (1)
we win a job during the time-to-go σ (2) otherwise we end up at node i, we decide to move pro-
actively to node δ and we win a job during this time τ eiδ (3) otherwise we end up at node δ and we
wait until we win the next job over there. That is, we only face a decision δ if the vehicle arrives
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at the schedule destination and no auction has been won in between. In the remainder of this
section, we will show that we can express the corresponding value function for each case using a
partial value function V p (i, σ, η, t), which is defined as the expected future revenue during a finite
period [θ+σ, θ+σ+ t] for a truck ending in location i given he wins an order at time η during his
time-to-go σ. The end value is then derived by combining the three partial value functions. First,
we will derive the expression for case (1), next we will derive the expression for case (2) and (3).
In case (1), the next job is won within the time-to-go σ, say at time θ + η (0 ≤ η ≤ σ). We
define pikl (σ − η) as the conditional probability that a truck ending in location i will have a trip
from k to l as next job, given that the corresponding agent wins a job at time θ + η. Here σ − η
is the time between winning an order and the earliest time he can actually start this order. Note
that the probability of winning a specific order may depend on this time because orders have
time-window restrictions and these time-windows may differ per route. We define the expected
rewards of a job from k to l that is won at time θ + η by rikl (σ − η). Now the next job from k
to l ends at time σ + τ eik + τ
f
kl from now on. If τ
e
ik + τ
f
kl ≤ t (the job is handled within the time
horizon T = σ + t), then we include the full profit in the value function. Otherwise we include
a fraction t
τeik+τ
f
kl
corresponding to the percentage of the job that is completed within the time
horizon. The next end value is the value at the new end location l at time σ + τeik + τ
f
kl, so the
time to go from η on is σ+ τ eik+ τ
f
kl−η and the remaining time horizon is max
n
t− τeik − τ
f
kl, 0
o
.
By summation over all possible routes kl we get the following partial value function:
V p (i, σ, η, t) =
X
∀k,l∈N
pikl (σ − η)
⎡
⎢⎣
αikl (t) rikl (σ − η)+
V e
³
l, σ + τeik + τ
f
kl − η, t− τ eik − τ
f
kl
´
⎤
⎥⎦ (5)
where αikl (t) is the fraction of the profit that we include in the value function. This fraction is
given by:
αikl (t) = min
(
t
τeik + τ
f
kl
, 1
)
, t > 0 (6)
Obviously we put αikl (t) = 0 if t ≤ 0. By weighing over the time at which the next order is
won, which we describe using a probability density function fiσ (η) and corresponding distribution
function Fiσ (η), we find that the first part of the value function for the end-gap is given byR σ
0
fiσ (η)V p (i, σ, η, t) dη. Note that fiσ (η) is an exponential density because we assumed Poisson
arrivals, see Section 3.2.
In case (2) and (3), we do not win an order during the time-to-go σ. This happens with
probability 1−Fiσ (σ). Then we have to find the best option for the pro-active move to location δ
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which takes a time time τ eiδ and which costs c
t (τeiδ) (if δ = i we wait at node i without costs for an
pro-active move). Therefore, we compute the expected revenues and costs if we move pro-actively
to δ and we select the option with maximum revenues in our recursion:
• In case (2), we win the next job at time θ + η0 before arrival at node δ (0 ≤ η0 ≤ τeiδ). The
remaining time horizon directly after arrival at the end-node δ is given by t−τ eiδ. Therefore,
we find that the partial value function is given by V p (δ, τ eiδ, η
0, t− τ eiδ), which we have to
weigh over the time at which the next order is won, having density function fδτeiδ (η
0).
• In case (3), we win the next job at time θ + η00 after arrival at node δ (η00 > τeiδ). The new
time-to-go is therefore also η00 and the remaining time horizon after winning this new job is
t− τ eiδ − η00. The partial value function for this case is given by V p (δ, η00, η00, t− τeiδ − η00).
Again, we have to weigh this function over the time at which the next order is won, having
density function fδ0 (η00). Note that this probability density function is slightly different
because we do not have the condition that we win during the time-to-go σ which is zero in
this case.
By combining the value functions for the three cases, we find the following relation for the end
value:
V e (i, σ, t) =
Z σ
0
fiσ (η)V p (i, σ, η, t) dη + (7)
(1− Fiσ (σ))max
δ
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
−ct (τeiδ) +
R τeiδ
0
fδτeiδ (η
0)V p (δ, τ eiδ, η
0, t− τeiδ) dη0
+
¡
1− Fδτeiδ (τ
e
iδ)
¢ R∞
0
fδ0 (η00)V p (δ, η00, η00, t− τeiδ − η00) dη00
⎫
⎪⎬
⎪⎭
We have the boundary constraint that for t ≤ 0 both V e (i, σ, t) = 0 and V p (i, σ, η, t) = 0.
The recursion for the gap value V g (i, j, σ, t) is derived in a similar manner with three excep-
tions. First the state is given by (i, j, σ, t) (see beginning of Section 4). This implies that the node
j at the end of the gap has to be passed to the next iteration. Second, we use another boundary
condition V g (i, j, σ, t) = −∞ if t ≤ 0 and i 6= j, meaning that we have to arrive on time at the
gap-destination j. Third, because transitions and corresponding revenues are dependent on the
restrictions at the end of the gap, we also have to pass the end-node j and remaining gap time t
in the transition functions pikl (σ − η, j, t) and revenue functions rikl (σ − η, j, t).
Unfortunately, the exact calculation of the value functions is very time-consuming. Two main
reasons are: (1) the state space can be very large (2) it is not possible to solve the equations
recursively (even not if we discretize time), because a value function depends on other value
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functions with both a larger and smaller time-to-go σ. So in fact, we have to solve a large system
of equations. Therefore, we present some approximations in the next section.
4.3 Value function approximations
Even with perfect knowledge of the states, solving the recursions of the previous section is a
complex and time-consuming process. This is especially due to the integration over all winning
moments and the large state space. Computation time is an issue because decisions have to be
made in real time. In this section we describe three approximations: (1) discretization of time,
(2) replacing the time-to-go σ with its expectation and (3) approximation of gap values by using
the same parameters as for the end values. In section 4.3.1, we discuss the approximation of the
end values. Next, we address the approximation of the gap values in Section 4.3.2.
4.3.1 End value approximation
As a first approximation we discretize time into intervals of length ε in order to reduce the problem
to a stochastic dynamic programming problem. For ease of notation, we assume that the time
dimension is chosen such that ε = 1. Then, we use a discrete probability density qiσ (η) instead of
the continuous density fiσ (η), where qiσ (η) denotes the probability that the vehicle will receive
an order in the time interval (θ + η, θ + η + 1] if the schedule ends at location i and the time-to-go
is σ.
In the next approximation we replace the time-to-go σ with an average σ¯. Because the state
is now independent of the time-to-go σ, we can reduce this state to {i, t} and we are able to
derive approximate value functions recursively. However we do not use this approximation for the
first step of the recursive value functions. Therefore we distinguish between the value of the first
uncertain move after the end of the current schedule and all further uncertain moves (an idea from
Powell et al. (1988)). The first uncertain move occurs directly after arrival at node i, which is the
schedule destination or the starting node of a gap. All further uncertain moves occur after that.
This process is illustrated for the end value of a schedule in Figure 4 with current time 9:00. The
destination of the schedule is node C with time-to-go 4 hours. Because we are looking at the end
value, all moves before 13:00 are treated as certain moves. There is a probability (case 1) that
we receive a next job before arrival at our current schedule destination. In this case we will have
a first uncertain move directly after 13:00 consisting of a full move and possible preceded by an
empty move. Otherwise (case 2) we will make a pro-active move towards node B and receive a
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Figure 4: Approximation of end values
job during this pro-active move. Otherwise (case 3) we wait at node B until we win a job. After
the first uncertain move we approximate all further possible moves, indicated by the grey dotted
lines.
We denote the approximate value functions of all moves after the first uncertain move by V˜ e
and V˜ g, for the end value and the gap value respectively. The new value function Vˆ e (i, σ, t) for
all uncertain moves, including the first uncertain move, is given by:
Vˆ e (i, σ, t) =
σX
η=0
qiσ (η) V˜ p (i, σ, η, t) + (8)
(1− Fiσ (σ))max
δ
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
−ct (τ eiδ) +
Pτeiδ
η0=0 qδτeiδ (η
0) V˜ p (δ, τ eiδ, η
0, t− τeiδ)
+
¡
1− Fiτeiδ (τ
e
iδ)
¢P∞
η00=0 qδ0 (η
00) V˜ p (δ, η00, η00, t− τeiδ − η00)
⎫
⎪⎬
⎪⎭
where V˜ p is the approximate partial value function. This function is exactly the same as Equation
5 with the only exception that the end value V e (i, σ, t) is replaced by the approximate end value
V˜ e (i, t) = Vˆ e (i, σ¯, t) for all uncertain moves after the first uncertain move.
The value of the first uncertain move only is given by Vˆ e (i, σ, t) where the approximate end
values V˜ e are set equal to zero. This first uncertain move is calculated rather precisely because
we still use the actual time-to-go σ. The value Vˆ e (i, σ, t) of all uncertain movements is easily
calculated once we known the approximate end values V˜ e (i, t). In these approximate end values
we reduced the state space to {i, t} which enable us to solve it by using a simple backwards
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stochastic dynamic programming recursion. At each single (discrete) point in time we calculate
the probability that we win an auction during the average time-to-go σ¯. If we do not win an
auction, we make a proactive move (ending multiple time-units ahead) or we wait a single period
at this node. We now have the following backwards recursion:
Algorithm 1 Calculating the approximate end values
init:
given a planning horizon T
V˜ e (i, 0) = 0 ∀i
for t = 1 to T do
for i = 1..N do
V˜ e (i, t) =
Pσ
η=0 qiσ¯ (η) V˜
p (i, σ¯, η, t)+(1− Fiσ¯ (σ¯))maxδ
n
−ct (τeiδ) + V˜ e (δ, t−max (τeiδ, 1))
o
V˜ p (i, σ¯, η, t) =
P
k,l∈N pikl (σ¯ − η)
h
αikl (t) rikl (σ¯ − η) + V˜ e
³
l, t− τeik − τ
f
kl
´i
end;
end;
To summarize, the approximate end values V˜ e (i, t) provide the expected revenue during a
period of length t after arrival at node i. We use this approximation only for the uncertain moves
after the first uncertain move. The value of all uncertain moves is given by Vˆ e (i, σ, t), where we
use V˜ e (i, t) in the approximate partial value function.
4.3.2 Gap value approximation
We approximate the gap values analogously to the end values. First, we replace the gap value
function V g (i, j, σ, t) by Vˆ g (i, j, σ, t) where time is discretized. For all uncertain moves after the
first uncertain move within a gap we use the approximate gap values V˜ g (i, j, t) = Vˆ g (i, j, σ¯, t)
where we replace the time-to-go σ by σ¯.
At the end of Section 4 we mentioned that the transition and revenue functions for gap values
differ from the end values because we have to take into account that a vehicle should end at node j
in a remaining gap time t. This is a complication for the recursive expressions, because we have to
store more information (opportunity costs for all possible states) and it requires more computation
time. Therefore, as an approximation, we ignore the gap restrictions and we approximate the tran-
sition probabilities pikl (σ − η, j, t) by pikl (σ − η) and the revenues rikl (σ − η, j, t) by rikl (σ − η).
This approximation also provides some notational convenience because the gap value function can
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now be described by the same parameters as the end value function. Improvement by omitting
these approximations is straightforward as we will see in Section 5.2.
A drawback of our approximation is that we may overestimate the winning probabilities, es-
pecially if we face a transition that involves a significant risk that we will violate the restrictions
at the end of the gap. Then, it is possible that we make a non-profitable transition, e.g., if we
had taken the restrictions at the end of the gap into account we would not have made a certain
transition. To overcome this we multiply the transition probabilities with a decision variable δakl.
This variable equals 1 if we accept the transition from k to l and otherwise it is zero. The logic
behind this decision variable is that a vehicle always has the option to wait a single time unit if
this seems to be more profitable than making this non-profitable transition. The approximate gap
values are given by:
Algorithm 2 Calculating the approximate gap values
init:
given an end-node j and gap length t
V˜ g (i, j, s) = −∞ for all i 6= j with s < 0 and V˜ g (j, j, 0) = 0
for s = 1 to t do
for i = 1..N do
V˜ g (i, j, s) = max
δakl, ∀k,l∈N
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
Pσ
η=0 qiσ¯ (η) V˜
p (i, j, σ¯, η, t)+
(1− Fiσ¯ (σ¯) + u (i, η))maxδ
⎛
⎜⎝
−ct (τeiδ)+
V˜ g (δ, j, s−max (τ eiδ, 1))
⎞
⎟⎠
⎫
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎬
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎭
V˜ p (i, j, σ¯, η, t) =
P
k,l∈N δ
a
klpikl (σ¯ − η)
h
αikl (t) rikl (σ¯ − η) + V˜ g
³
l, j, t− τeik − τ
f
kl
´i
u (i, η) = qiσ¯ (η < σ¯)
³
1−
P
k,l∈N δ
a
klpikl (σ¯ − η)
´
end;
end;
where u (i, η) it the probability that we did not accept a transition for a job won at time η
after node i.
5 Parameter estimation
Because we have deterministic travel times, we assume that all vehicles are aware of the loaded
travel times τfij and empty travel times τ
e
ij for all routes i, j ∈ N . This leaves us with the following
parameters that we need to estimate in order to calculate the (approximate) value functions:
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• The average time-to-go σ¯
• The conditional probability pikl (σ − η) that a truck ending in location i will have a trip
from k to l as next job, given that the corresponding agent wins a job at time θ+ η < θ+σ.
• The expected rewards rikl (σ − η) of a job from k to l that is won at time θ+ η < θ+σ with
starting node i.
• The conditional probability qiσ (η) that we win a new job at time θ+η < θ+σ if the schedule
ends at node i, given that we win a job during the time-to-go σ.
• The distribution function Fiσ (σ) that we win a new job during the time-to-go σ if the
schedule ends at node i.
We estimate these parameters and functions based on historic data. A possibility is to store
all historic waiting times, revenues, travel times and transition percentages for all possible states.
Even when these parameters do not depend on the time-to-go σ, we must store a lot of information.
Therefore we propose to estimate these parameters based on auction data for certain routes and
the job arrival intensity for these routes. To enable the vehicle agents to estimate these parameters
for their bid price calculation, they will receive the following information from their fleet manager:
• The sample mean x¯ij and sample variance s2ij of all observations of the winning price for all
routes i, j ∈ N
• Average job arrival intensities λij for all routes i, j ∈ N
• Average time-window length zij for jobs on all routes i, j ∈ N
• Average time-to-go σ¯
These parameters are estimated by the fleet manager because he just receives more information
than a single vehicle. The arrival intensities λij and time-window lengths zij are estimated based
on the job announcement characteristics by taking the average of past observations. The average
time-to-go σ¯ is estimated as the average time between winning and picking up an order. This
value coincides with the average length of a schedule in the value function recursions because we
assumed there that all orders are scheduled at the end of the schedule.
In the next section we describe how the vehicles estimate the distribution of the lowest bid using
the sample mean and variance provided by their fleet manager. In Section 5.2 we describe how
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the vehicles calculate the transition probabilities pikl (σ − η) and expected revenues rikl (σ − η).
Calculation of the winning probabilities qiσ (η) and distribution Fiσ (σ) of winning moments is
given in Section 5.3.
5.1 Distribution of lowest bids
The estimation of the distribution parameters of the lowest bids depends on the structure of the
auction. Here, we use an open second-price auction, where only the winning price, i.e. the one
but lowest bid, is published. To estimate the distribution of the lowest bid, fleet managers can use
information about all winning prices together with their own bid history. Because your own bids
provide little information about the bids of your competitors we only use information about the
winning prices. This causes a problem, because we need the probability distribution of the lowest
price whereas we only have observations of the one but lowest price. In this section, we discuss
how we deal with this problem.
We will use the theory of the so-called Extreme Value Distributions (EVD), being a class
of probability distributions for the order statistics of a large set of random observations from the
same (arbitrary) distribution. Particularly, the EVD cover the minimum and maximum value, but
also a limiting distribution for the one but lowest (highest) observation is known. These limiting
distributions have the same parameter set. Therefore, we estimate the parameters of the limiting
distribution for the one but lowest bid and we use these estimated parameters for the limiting
distribution of the minimum bid. Below, we elaborate this approach in formulas.
Suppose that the bids bi for a single job from competitor i (i = 1..n) are independent and
identically distributed with a cumulative distribution function H (x). We denote the probability
distribution functions of the corresponding order statistics by Hi(x). The probability distribution
of the first two order statistics are given by the following expressions:
H1 (x) = 1− Pr (b1 > x, b2 > x, ..., bn > x) = 1− (1−H(x))n (9)
H2 (x) = nHn−1 (x) [1−H (x)] +Hn (x)
Except for special cases, it is not possible to express these distributions as closed form expres-
sion with parameters that can easily be estimated. It is shown in (Gumbel 1958) that for any
well-behaved initial distribution (i.e., H(x) is continuous and has an inverse), limiting distributions
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for n −→ ∞ can be derived. In this paper, we use the Gumbel distribution which only request
that the tail of the distribution of H (x) declines exponentially (normal, log-normal, exponential,
and gamma). The Gumbel distribution for the minimum value in a sample is given by:
G1 (x) = 1− e−e
x−α
β
(10)
where α and β > 0 are the location and scale parameters. The Gumbel distribution for the second
lowest value has exactly the same parameters and is given by:
G2 (x) = 1−
µ
e−e
x−α
β
³
1 + e
x−α
β
´¶
(11)
We will use G1 and G2 to approximate H1 and H2 respectively. We see that then we can
estimate the parameters α and β using observations from G2(x) and insert these parameters in
G1(x). Various statistical methods can be used to estimate α and β, depending on the observed
data. In case of an open auction we can simply use the Method of Moments. From the moments
of the standard Gumbel distribution Gn (x), see Reiss and Thomas (1997), we derive the following
values for the location and scale parameter of G2 (x):
βij =
s
s2ij
1
6π
2 − 1
(12)
αij = x¯ij + βij (γ − 1)
where γ = 0.577216... is Euler’s constant, x¯ij and s2ij are respectively the sample mean and sample
variance of all historical winning prices (the second-lowest bids) for orders on route i, j. The sample
mean and sample variance are provided to the vehicle agents by their fleet manager so that they
are able to calculate the location and scale parameters of the Gumbel distribution of the lowest
bid. In the remainder we will indicate this distribution by Hminij (x) which in fact describes the
probability that a vehicle will loose an auction given his bid price x.
Note that we used the assumption that bids in successive rounds are independent and identically
distributed (iid) random variables. We may question whether that assumption is realistic, because
the system state (state of the vehicles) will be quite similar in successive auctioning rounds unless
the order arrival frequency is very low. However, Reiss and Thomas (1997) states that even if
the distributions H (x) are not exactly known or the iid condition of the bids fails, then H1 may
still be an accurate approximation of the actual distribution of the minimum. Because H2 can be
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expressed as a function of H1 the same holds for the distribution of the second lowest bid.
5.2 Estimating revenues and transition probabilities
In order to estimate the revenues and transition probabilities, the vehicle agent uses so-called
winning intensities. The winning intensities provide for all routes the intensity at which the fleet
manager expects to win jobs given a certain state. We define the winning intensity ξikl (σ) as the
mean number of winning jobs per time unit from k to l after arrival at node i with time-to go σ.
The winning intensities are given by:
ξikl (σ) = λkl · pwinikl (σ) (13)
where pwinikl (σ) is the probability of winning a job from k to l with starting node i and time-to-go
σ, given by
pwinikl (σ) = 1−Hminkl (bikl (σ)) (14)
Here bikl (σ) is the bid price for the vehicle given a job on route kl, location i and time-to-go σ.
This bid price consists of the direct costs ckl (σ) and the opportunity costs OCikl (σ):
bikl (σ) = ckl (σ) +OCikl (σ) (15)
The direct costs (see Equation 2) are given by:
ckl (σ) = ct
³
τfkl
´
+ cp (σ − zkl)+ (16)
The opportunity costs however are not known yet because this whole approach is focused on
finding them. Therefore we use an estimate based on previous opportunity costs charged in this
state. In case of end values, we approximate the opportunity costs by:
OCikl (σ) = V˜ e (i, σ) + ct (τeik)− V˜ e
³
l, σ + τeik + τ
f
kl
´
(17)
Here we used the approximate value functions to reduce computation time. A difference with
original opportunity costs function (Equation 3) is that the value of the gap before the new job
is replaced by the costs for an empty move. This because the time for an empty move can not be
used for a loaded move.
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In Section 4.3 we mentioned that we use the same parameters for the gap value function. If we
choose to include the gap restrictions in our transition- and revenue functions, then all functions
above are also dependent on the end-node j and the gap length t. However, this change will only
affect the calculation of the opportunity costs, which in case of gap values are given by:
OCikl (j, σ, t) = V g (i, j, σ, t) + ct (τ eik)− V g
³
l, j, σ + τ eik + τ
f
kl, t− τeik − τ
f
kl
´
(18)
In the end value function (Equation 7) we integrate the expected revenues over all possible
winning moments η. Given that we win a job during time-to-go σ at time η, the remaining time-
to-go is γ = σ− η. Then the probability pikl (γ) that the winning job has origin k and destination
l given location i is given by:
pikl (γ) =
ξikl (γ)P
kl ξikl (γ)
(19)
The expected revenue as a function of the winning time-to-go γ is given by the difference
between the expected lowest bid of the competitors (given that the own bid is lower) and the costs
that are made:
rikl (γ) =
1
1−Hminikl (bikl (γ))
Z ∞
x=bikl(γ)
xdHminikl (x)− ckl (γ)− ct (τ eik) (20)
In our simulation experiments (see Section 7) we solve this function numerically.
5.3 Distribution of winning moments
We described the winning moments η by a distribution function Fiσ (η). Difficulty is that the
winning moments follow a so-called nonhomogeneous Poisson process (NHPP), see (Ross 2003).
When time-windows, penalty costs or travel costs differ per route, than also transition probabilities
will be time dependent. At different points in time, different jobs will have the highest winning
probability. To ease our notation we introduce the following definition:
Λiσ (t) =
Z t
0
X
kl
ξikl (t) (σ − u) du (21)
The value Λiσ(t) is called the rate function of the nonhomogeneous Poisson process because
the counting process of winning jobs can be described by a Poisson process with mean Λiσ(t). The
distribution function of the random amount of time η until the first time we win an auction, given
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Figure 5: Job insertion in a gap
we win this order during time-to-go σ with starting node i, is given by:
Fiσ (η) =
1− e−Λiσ(η)
1− e−Λiσ(σ) , 0 ≤ η ≤ σ, σ > 0 (22)
For the special case with time-to-go zero, the winning moments follow a homogeneous Poisson
process. Then we have the following distribution function:
Fi0 (η) = 1− e−η
S
kl ξikl(0) (23)
Because we discretized time we use the following discrete probabilities:
qiσ (η) = Fiσ
³
η +
ε
2
´
− Fiσ
³
η − ε
2
´
(24)
Recall that we standardize the time dimension by choosing ε = 1.
6 Waiting strategies
Until now, we assumed that a new job is scheduled as early as possible. However, this does not
need to be optimal. The vehicle agents may use a more advanced waiting strategy consisting of
two types of waiting decisions, namely (1) the choice for a suitable pick-up time for a given job
and (2) a pro-active move policy that tells the vehicle agent where to wait after arrival at some
node and for how long.
Decisions regarding the pick-up time for jobs have to be taken while calculating a bid. Extra
waiting time can be incorporated in anticipation of future job insertions. We consider the following
two situations: (1) the new job will be scheduled in a gap and (2) the new job will be scheduled
at the end of the current schedule.
Consider a load ϕ and a gap with start-node i, end-node j, time-to-go σ and gap length t (see
Figure 5). When the new order is inserted in this gap, we possibly get two new gaps. The optimal
pickup-time ω∗ is calculated by maximizing the value of these new gaps:
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ω∗ = max
ω
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
Vˆ g (i, o (ϕ) , σ, ω − σ − θ)− cp (max (0, ω − e (ϕ)))+
Vˆ g
³
d (ϕ) , j, ω + τfo(ϕ)d(ϕ), t− ω + σ + θ − τ
f
o(ϕ)d(ϕ)
´
⎫
⎪⎬
⎪⎭
(25)
where we use discrete time intervals with length ε for ω. Note that ω lies between the earliest
pickup-time θ+σ+τ ei,o(ϕ) and the latest pickup-time θ+σ+t−τ
f
o(ϕ)d(ϕ)−τ ed(ϕ),j . The pickup-time
ω∗ for a job at the end of the schedule is calculated in a similar manner:
ω∗ = max
ω
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
Vˆ g (i, o (ϕ) , σ, ω − σ − θ)− cp (max (0, ω − e (ϕ)))+
Vˆ e
³
d (ϕ) , ω + τfo(ϕ)d(ϕ)
´
⎫
⎪⎬
⎪⎭
(26)
where ω ≥ θ + σ + τei,o(ϕ).
To reduce computation time, we can use the approximations V˜ e and V˜ g. Therefore we
only need to calculate V˜ g
³
i, o (ϕ) , t− τfo(ϕ)d(ϕ) − τed(ϕ),j
´
, V˜ g
³
d (ϕ) , j, t− τ ei,o(ϕ) − τ
f
o(ϕ)d(ϕ)
´
,
and V˜ e (d (ϕ) , T ), and store all intermediate values from the dynamic programming recursions.
Whenever a vehicle becomes idle, it has to decide upon a pro-active move. This decision can
simply be found by using the parts of the value functions for which we assume we have to wait.
Using Equation 8, we find that the best waiting decision δ∗ (i) at node i in case of an end-gap is
given by:
δ∗ (i) = max
δ∈N
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
−ct (τeiδ) +
Pτeiδ
η0=0 pδτeiδ (η
0) V˜ p (δ, τeiδ, η
0, t− τeiδ)
+ (1− Pi (τ eiδ))
P∞
η00=0 pδ0 (η
00) V˜ p (δ, η00, η00, t− τeiδ − η00)
⎫
⎪⎬
⎪⎭
(27)
If we are at the end of our schedule and we have a stationary order arrival process, than this
decision has to be taken only once. If there is a more profitable node δ than the current node i,
then it will move directly towards this node, otherwise it will wait at node i until the next job.
In case of a gap, this decision has to be taken at every moment in the gap for which the vehicle
is not active. However, an optimal waiting strategy can be found in advance using the approximate
gap values which are already calculated with Algorithm 2. In this recursion we established the
best waiting decision for each node i and remaining gap length δ. Searching these values will
provide the time at which the vehicle has to move to the end-node of the gap, given that it did
not receive another job in this gap.
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7 Simulation
In this section we discuss the results of a concise simulation study. The goal of this study is to
provide some insight in the performance of opportunity based bid pricing compared to a pricing
strategy where only the direct costs are taken into account. An extensive study on the effects
in different market settings (i.e. number of companies, company size and different strategies of
players) is out of the scope of this paper and subject for further research.
We compare opportunity based bid pricing to a naïve pricing strategy where only the direct
costs of job insertions is taken into account. Because this naïve strategy is not able to value
opportunities, we use a simple waiting strategy where new jobs are scheduled as early as possible
at a certain place in the schedule.
When we use fixed contracts with this naïve strategy, new jobs will always be added to the end
of the schedule. Therefore we will also consider flexible contract agreements in order to provide a
’fair’ conclusion about the benefit of using opportunity costs. With flexible contracts vehicles are
not committed to agreed pickup and delivery times, so that the scheduled times can be modified
later on, possibly at the costs of additional penalties due to time-window violation. Because
we assumed fixed contracts throughout this paper we have to modify the opportunity based bid
pricing approach for flexible contracts. We do this by simply ignoring the gap values, i.e. the price
of a new job insertion is given by the change in direct costs and the change in the end values.
An important aspect of the implementation of the agent-based planning concept is the market
situation. We consider two simplified market structures. First an open network where we apply
the opportunity based bid pricing approach to a single company while the other companies use the
naïve pricing strategy. Second a closed network where all companies will use the same planning
method.
The opportunity based bid pricing approach was developed for open markets where we apply
this strategy to an individual company and assume that it does not affect the behavior of the
other companies. This is a basic assumption of our approach because current decisions (bid price
calculation) are based on historical observations of auction data. The closed market structure can
be seen as an internal application of our approach. For example if we apply our approach to a
closed consortium of transportation companies or even to a single transportation company where
the trucks compete against each other. When all players are using the same value functions this
may have serious influence on the prices in the system. This is especially true if the behavior of all
players is exactly the same, that is, if they use the same historical data, update their parameters
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Factor Range
Contracts fixed / flexible
Using opportunity costs yes / no
Market open / closed
Time-windows short / long
Table 1: Experimental factors
at the same time etc. Then the winning intensities of all players will remain constant. We include
this behavior by setting the opportunity costs in the expected bid price (Equation 15) in the
dynamic programming recursions equal to zero.
7.1 Settings
We consider a raster network with 9 (3x3) nodes. The horizontal and vertical distances between
nodes are 25 km. The travel distances are Euclidian and we use three companies each having three
vehicles. Orders arrive according to a Poisson process with mean interarrival time of 9 minutes.
The network is unbalanced in the sense that some nodes are more popular than others. In our
simulation model, we proceed as follows. For a given order, we first generate an origin and next a
destination that is different from the origin. The probability of being an origin for nodes on row 1
is 5 times higher than row 2 and 25 times higher than row 3. Given an origin node, all destination
nodes are generated with equal probability.
In our simulation experiments, we vary the experimental factors as shown in Table 1. The
short (long) time-window is 4 (6) hours. The travel speed of vehicles is 72 km/hour, the travel
cost function is given by ct (t) = t and the penalty costs function by cp (t) = 10t. The loading
and unloading times are both 5 minutes per job. For the dynamic programming recursions we
discretize time into periods of 1 minute.
We use a replication / deletion approach for our simulations, cf. (Law and Kelton 2000), where
each experiment consists of a number of replications (each with different seeds) of 16 days, each
including a one-day warm-up period. To determine the number of replications we consider the
percentage of driving loaded (DL) and the service levels (SL) of all experiments. The maximum
number of replications needed with a confidence level of 95% and a relative error of 5% (for both
performance indicators) is 10. To facilitate comparison we use 10 replications for all experiments.
29
7.2 Results
We use the following performance indicators: (i) the percentage of driving loaded (DL) which is
the percentage of the total distance we have travelled loaded and (ii) the service level (SL) which
is the percentage of jobs that are delivered on time. In the open network setting we also use the
relative profit (RP) which is the profit of the smart company compared to the average profit of
his competitors. The results for the closed network can be found in Table 2.
OC Contract Time-windows DL SL
false flexible short 61 90
true flexible short 61 98
false flexible long 62 97
true flexible long 62 100
false fixed short 59 87
true fixed short 60 94
false fixed long 59 96
true fixed long 60 99
Table 2: Triangular network with closed market
We find that using opportunity costs always yields an increase in service level. This is caused
by three things. First of all the workload is spread more equally among the vehicles. The average
schedule length of vehicles is roughly 20% lower for all 4 experimental settings. Second, vehicle
agents tend to schedule unattractive jobs (jobs with high probability of an empty move towards
the origin or from the destination node) relatively later in the schedule. This leads to an increase
in probability that the empty move can be replace by a new loaded move. For example orders
to a node on the third row (the row with lowest probability of becoming origin of an order) are
scheduled with a time-to-go 40% longer than for jobs to a node on the first row. Third, in case of
fixed contracts, the vehicles create gaps to avoid empty moves. With short time-windows we have
10 gaps with 8 filled. In case of long time-windows there 83 gaps created that are filled with 118
orders. Approximately 90% of the gaps are created before orders leaving from a node on the first
row that are schedule a long time-to-go in advance.
The results of the open market setting can be found in Table 3. The columns DL and SL
consists of two values, the first is the value for the single company that apply opportunity based
bid pricing, while the second value is the average value for the other two companies.
From these results we see that using opportunity based bid pricing always results in a better
performance. There is always an increase in capacity utilization, service level and profits. Espe-
cially in case of long time-windows, the average profit is up to 4.16 times higher than the average
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Contract Time-windows DL SL RP
flexible short 69 / 59 98 / 95 195 %
flexible long 69 / 59 100 / 98 362 %
fixed short 68 / 57 92 / 87 124 %
fixed long 68 / 57 100 / 99 416 %
Table 3: Open market settings for both networks
profit of the competitors.
The company using opportunity costs effectively uses gaps to reduce empty moves, thereby
increasing capacity utilization and profits. In case of short time-windows this company created 29
gaps that are filled with 24 orders. In case of long time-windows there are 39 gaps filled with 36
orders. However, the main reason for the high profits of the company using opportunity costs is
that it picks out the most profitable jobs. Because the ’smart’ company is driving more effectively,
it is able to handle more orders. For example, in case of fixed contracts with long time-windows,
the ’smart’ company has won 26% more orders. Given the relative profit of 416%, the profit per
order is much higher. In this experiment we see that the ’smart’ company wins 6 times more orders
towards a node on row 1 and 5 times less to a node on row 3. Moreover, 84% of its transport takes
place on the first row.
8 Relaxation of assumptions
Throughout this paper we made several assumptions. In this section we relax some of these
assumptions by successively introducing look-ahead, closed auctions and gap evaluation in case of
flexible contracts.
We defined the look-ahead of job ϕ as the time between announcement a (ϕ) and earliest pickup
time s (ϕ). Suppose that the look-ahead for a job on route i, j can be estimated by aij . In order to
incorporate look-ahead we need two modifications. First, the most suitable pickup time ω will now
be ω0 = max (ω, θ + aij). Second, we have to reckon with lookahead in the dynamic programming
recursions. For example, the new time-to-go after accepting a new job has to be modified from
σ + τeik + τ
f
kl to max (akl, σ + τ
e
ik) + τ
f
kl.
Throughout this paper we assumed that all bidders receive information about the winning
prices. In case of a closed auction, bidders only receive information about whether they win or
loose an auction. In fact, we have censored data for the distribution of the minimum price. In
principle, we can handle this using e.g. Maximum Likelihood estimation.
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Gap evaluation in combination with flexible contract agreements is slightly more difficult. Using
the flexible contracts, new jobs can be inserted at any place at any time in the current schedule,
possible rescheduling other jobs. Therefore we have to evaluate all possible gap lengths between
all successive jobs. To reduce computation time we propose the following. Given a schedule with
m jobs, a new job can be inserted at m possible places. We indicate each alternative schedule m
by Ψm, the current schedule of a vehicle by Ψ∗, and the value of a schedule Ψ is given by W (Ψ).
Then the bid price is given by the difference between the value of the best proposed schedule and
the value of his current schedule:
b =W (Ψ∗)−max
m
W (Ψm) (28)
The value of a schedule is given by the sum of the direct costs of all jobs, all gap values and
the end value. Although all gaps are flexible, the vehicle agent will calculate the most profitable
pickup time ωi for all jobs i. These pickup times ωi can be found using the expressions from
Section 6, where the possible pickup times can be bounded by for example the latest pickup times
for jobs i+ 1, ..|Ψ|.
9 Conclusions
In this paper, we presented an opportunity based bidding concept. This method makes it possible
to determine the value a schedule, more specifically the value of gaps in the schedule and the value
of a schedule destination. This enables us to calculate the opportunity costs which are defined
as the loss in expected future revenues due to a new job insertion. By including this value in
our bid price we not only cover the direct costs of an insertion, but also its future implications.
Therefore we prevent less profitable moves and increase our opportunities by better prepositioning
of vehicles. In addition, the value functions that are used to calculate the opportunity costs can
also be used to determine a waiting strategy.
From our simulation experiments, we conclude that an individual player using opportunity
based bid pricing will perform significantly better than other players who use a more naïve pricing
strategy. This holds not only in terms of profits, but also higher vehicle utilization and higher
service levels. But also in closed environments (internal use of our approach), opportunity based
bid-pricing can result in higher service levels. We explain these results from the following behavior.
First, the vehicle agents tend to schedule unattractive jobs later increasing the probability of
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combining this job with another job. Second, in case of fixed contract agreements, the vehicle
agents tend to create gaps before unattractive jobs, possibly reducing empty moves. Third, in
case of open markets, the vehicle agents tend to select out the most profitable jobs.
Further research includes an extensive simulation study on the emergent behavior of agent-
based transportation networks. Therefore we will consider different market settings, other auction
mechanisms (first price auctions and combinatorial auctions) and different strategies for different
fleet managers (for example specialization in certain regions). Furthermore, some interesting model
extensions need to be examined, such as stochastic travel times, learning with feedback and using
information on the number of vehicles per nodes for bid pricing. Also, faster methods are useful
for real-time decision making. Regarding the latter, we might think of functional approximations
of the discrete value functions and aggregation methods in large networks, for example by using
value functions per region (cluster of locations) instead of for each separate location.
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